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RESEARCH ARTICLE
What were they thinking? An exploration of child sexual offenders’
beliefs using a lexical decision task
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Cognitive distortions have been afforded a key role in the offending behaviour of
child sexual offenders. While the mechanisms underlying cognitive distortions are
not fully understood, they are generally thought to reflect entrenched beliefs that
distinguish child sexual offenders from other individuals. We investigated this
hypothesis using a robust experimental technique called the lexical decision task.
Child sexual offenders, offender controls, and non-offender controls completed a
lexical decision task in which they responded to words that completed sentences
in either an offence-supportive or nonoffence-supportive manner. Contrary to
predictions, child sexual offenders did not respond faster to words that were
consistent with offence-supportive beliefs, relative to controls. However, they did
show accelerated recognition for word stems supporting external locus of control
beliefs. These results highlight the need to use cognitive experimental methods to
study child sexual offenders’ beliefs, and the importance of investigating potential
alternative drivers of cognitive distortions.
Keywords: child sexual offenders; child molesters; beliefs; cognition; cognitive
distortions; lexical decision task
Introduction
Although child molestation receives widespread condemnation in modern western
society, a surprising number of (predominantly male) individuals are convicted or
cautioned for sexual abuse against children. What sets these people apart from
others? In attempting to answer this question, forensic psychologists have identified
four main clusters of symptoms or problems prevalent among child sex offenders
(Ward & Beech, 2005). These are: emotional regulation deficits, social problems,
deviant sexual arousal, and cognitive distortions.1 Of these, cognitive distortions
have gained particular attention among researchers and practitioners over the past
10 years.
Cognitive distortions were first introduced to the study of child sex offending by
Abel and colleagues (Abel, Becker, & Cunningham-Rathner, 1984; Abel et al., 1989).
Abel noted that child sexual offenders (CSOs) often make statements that seem to
excuse or justify their offending. Examples provided by Abel et al. (1984) included,
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‘A child who does not resist my sexual advances really wants to have sex with me’
(p. 98), and ‘Having sex with a child is a good way for an adult to teach the child
about sex’ (p. 99). Unfortunately, when describing these cognitive distortions Abel
and his colleagues were unclear about the mechanisms generating the statements.
Cognitive distortions were somewhat loosely referred to as, ‘cognitions or belief
systems’ (Abel et al., 1984, p. 98), and, later, ‘internal processes, including the
justifications, perceptions, and judgments used by the sex offender to rationalise his
child molestation behaviour’ (Abel et al., 1989, p. 134).
Over the years, conceptual and definitional issues have continued to plague the
term ‘cognitive distortions’ (see Gannon, Ward, & Collie, 2007). As some authors
have noted, it might be that some cognitive distortions are simply statements that
reflect self-serving biases. That is, they could be self-deceptive statements that CSOs
utter (that may or may not have been implicated in the offence) or post-offence
justifications and excuses designed to deflect public criticism (see Gannon &
Polaschek, 2006; Maruna & Mann, 2006). Nevertheless, there is a strong sense
throughout the literature that cognitive distortions reflect CSOs’ beliefs (Gannon
et al., 2007). When a CSO makes or endorses a proposition such as ‘harm cannot
come to the child if there is no penetration involved’, it is generally assumed that the
CSO believes it to be true that sexual activity without penetration is harmless for
children. As yet it is unclear to what extent cognitive distortions reflect beliefs rather
than other social and cognitive phenomena. As we shall argue, further research is
needed to clarify this issue. Hence, in this article when we use the term ‘cognitive
distortions’ we simply refer to the statements that offenders make to themselves or
others that in some way seem to excuse their offending.
In order to better understand CSOs’ beliefs, Ward (Ward & Keenan, 1999; Ward,
2000) organised the types of cognitive distortions that CSOs endorse into an
explanatory framework. After analysing the content of items listed in a range of
offence-supportive belief questionnaires, Ward and Keenan (1999) concluded that
cognitive distortions are driven by implicit theories (a type of schemata). Implicit
theories (ITs) are highly prescribed knowledge structures that CSOs are hypothesised
to hold concerning themselves and their social worlds. Like all schemata, ITs are
hypothesised to serve as pre-attentive filters that bias CSOs’ social information
processing. Ward argued that ITs develop during childhood in response to abnormal
childhood events (e.g. sexual abuse, physical abuse, and neglect) and the content of
these ITs eventually leads CSOs to attend to, and interpret, social information in self-
fulfilling, offence-supportive ways.
Ward and Keenan (1999) proposed that the following five ITs underlie the
cognitive distortions articulated by CSOs: children as sexual beings, nature of harm,
uncontrollability, dangerous world, and entitlement. The children as sexual beings IT
refers to beliefs that children have sexual interests and desires and that they are
capable of making informed decisions about sex. CSOs holding this IT are likely to
misinterpret children’s actions as being sexually provocative. Beliefs characterising
the nature of harm IT serve to minimise or deny the harm that sexual activity can
inflict on children. CSOs with this IT will sometimes attempt to justify their actions
by claiming that more harmful behaviours, such as physical assault, can be inflicted
against a child. Uncontrollability refers to beliefs that one’s life is chaotic and
uncontrollable. The CSO who holds this IT believes that they are overwhelmed by
powerful internal and external forces (e.g. sexual desire, drugs, alcohol, stress, social
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pressures), leaving them unable to shape their day-to-day existence. Beliefs contained
within the dangerous world IT hold that the world is a hostile place full of aggressive
and rejecting individuals who inflict pain and suffering on each other. In response,
one should either withdraw into the safety afforded by relationships with children
(who are viewed as innocent and accepting), or strike first by manipulating or
punishing whichever adults or children one can. Finally, individuals who hold the
entitlement IT believe that their personal characteristics or social role make them
superior to others, and consequently their needs and wants assume precedence over
the needs of others.
Regardless of whether or not CSOs’ beliefs are seen to be organised into a
schematic structure, the idea that CSOs do indeed hold offence-supportive beliefs is a
popular one. This raises the question: What supporting evidence is there that CSOs
hold abnormal, offence-supportive beliefs? Thus far, studies investigating CSOs’
beliefs have relied almost exclusively upon the use of questionnaires, an approach
that has yielded somewhat confusing results. Some researchers have found that
questionnaire measures can statistically discriminate CSOs from others. For example,
Bumby (1996) found that CSOs were more likely to endorse items on the MOLEST
scale than rapists or non-sexual offender controls, and Arkowitz and Vess (2003)
found that CSOs endorsed more MOLEST items than rapists. Researchers have also
found that CSOs appear more distorted than comparison groups when answering
Abel et al.’s (1989) Abel and Becker Cognitions Scale (Hayashino, Wurtele, & Klebe,
1995; Stermac & Segal, 1989), and the Hanson Sex Attitudes Questionnaire (Hanson,
Gizzarelli, & Scott, 1994). On the other hand, some studies have raised doubts about
the discriminative ability of cognitive distortion questionnaires (Abel et al., 1989;
Fisher, Beech, & Browne, 1999; Tierney & McCabe, 2001). For example, Abel et al.
(1989) found no significant differences between CSOs’ and non-CSO paraphilics’
responses to the Abel and Becker Cognitions Scale.
This lack of clarity may be attributable to difficulties associated with using
questionnaires to measure CSOs’ beliefs. For instance, as Langevin (1991) has
argued and Gannon, Keown, and Polaschek (2006) have demonstrated, CSOs may
not respond honestly when answering cognitive distortion questionnaires. In
addition, the questionnaire approach assumes that CSOs’ faulty beliefs are both
chronically accessible and readily open to offenders’ introspection, an assumption
that may well be unwarranted.
To overcome these issues, questionnaire studies should be complemented by
studies that employ methods which minimise both the opportunity for participants
to censure their responses and the need for them to introspect on potentially implicit
cognitions. As Greenwald and Banaji (1995) argue, it is ‘theoretically essential’ (p. 5)
that indirect measures be used to measure implicit cognitions within social
psychology. It therefore makes sense for researchers to borrow approaches from
the field of cognitive science, where highly sensitive methods have been specifically
designed to measure implicit cognitions. By allowing researchers to measure the way
in which humans attend to, encode, recall, and recognise stimuli, these methods
provide insight into the way that humans process information as well as the
structures that drive information processing.
In keeping with this approach, Mihailides, Devilly, and Ward (2004) and Gray,
Brown, MacCulloch, Smith, and Snowden (2005) used an experimental method  the
Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998)  to test the
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hypothesis that CSOs hold particular ITs. The implicit association test is a robust
technique used to measure the strength of associations existing between concepts
stored in long-term memory (see Greenwald et al., 1998; Swanson, Rudman, &
Greenwald, 2001). Mihailides et al. (2004) reasoned that if CSOs hold a children as
sexual beings IT, they should be faster to link the concept ‘children’ with sexual
words than nonsexual words relative to controls. Likewise, if CSOs hold uncontroll-
ability and entitlement ITs they should be faster to link the concepts ‘losing control’
and ‘mine’ with sexual words than nonsexual words relative to controls. Compared
to three non-sexual offending control groups, CSOs were significantly faster to link
words congruent with the children as sexual beings and uncontrollability ITs than
words incongruent with these theories; however, the same finding did not hold for
entitlement related words. Gray et al. (2005) have reported similar findings for items
appearing to tap the children as sexual beings IT.
An issue with implicit association test studies, however, is that they do not
support the hypothesis that CSOs hold schemata or beliefs that set them apart from
nonsexual offending individuals per se. Put another way, such studies do not
demonstrate, unequivocally, that CSOs process and misinterpret information in IT-
consistent ways. Instead, CSOs may, for instance, hold stronger associations between
children and sex concepts because they have discussed these associations more
frequently throughout the conviction process or while interacting with prison
psychologists.
A recent study by Gannon, Wright, Beech, and Williams (2006) appears to
support this contention. Gannon, Wright, Beech, and Williams used a cognitive
processing task to directly measure whether CSOs misinterpret social information.
The authors reasoned that if CSOs hold offence-supportive beliefs they should
interpret (and therefore recall) relevant material in a manner consistent with those
beliefs. They asked CSOs and offender controls to read a vignette describing a sexual
offence against a child. Ten ambiguous statements that could be interpreted in an
offence-supportive way were embedded within the vignette. Contrary to expecta-
tions, when each participant’s free recall of the vignette was analysed, CSOs showed
no differences in recall compared to other offenders; all participants misremembered
the vignette, but did so in a way that was not offence-supportive. Of course, it is
possible that offenders in Gannon et al.’s study censured their recollections so as to
appear less distorted, although the fact that few participants could articulate task
aims in a follow-up questionnaire suggests that impression management was not an
issue. In summary, the findings from Gannon et al.’s study are intriguing and
certainly highlight the need for further controlled, empirical research into the nature
of CSOs’ beliefs.
The main aim of our study is to conduct another experimental investigation into
the existence of ITs, by using an extremely robust technique called the lexical decision
task (LDT). If, like Gannon et al. (2006), this technique does not uncover evidence of
ITs in our CSO sample, the results of this study could add further weight to recent
theoretical work that questions the widespread existence of offence-supportive beliefs
in CSOs (see Gannon & Polaschek, 2006; Ward, Gannon, & Keown, 2006).
The LDT was first performed by Meyer and Schvaneveldt (1971), who asked
participants to indicate whether two simultaneously presented words were real words
or non-words. Results showed that participants were faster to respond when the
words were semantically related, (e.g. bread and butter) than when they were
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unrelated (e.g. doctor and butter). While differing versions of the LDT have since
been performed, the overarching results are the same: People are quicker to identify
words that follow contextual primes (i.e. a related word or concept) than words that
have followed non-related primes (Neely, 1991). For example, when a participant sees
the sentence stem John ate the . . . they will be faster to recognise the target word food
than the word foot (Forster, 1981). Research has indicated that this so-called
‘sentence context effect’ occurs only if the target word is the expected completion of
the sentence stem (Fischler & Bloom, 1979). In other words, participants will
respond faster to the target word only if they cognise that it is a likely ending to the
sentence. This finding makes sense in light of the fact that readers use their own
schemata to anticipate text content (Duffy, 1986; Fincher-Kiefer, 1992; Fitzgerald,
1995) and to spend less time processing the ends of sentences (Sharkey & Sharkey,
1987).
Researchers have successfully used the LDT as a means for exploring people’s
schemata (Baldwin, Fehr, Keedian, Seidel, & Thomson, 1993; Kay & Jost, 2003;
Mikulincer, 1998; Mikulincer, Birnbaum, Woddis, & Nachmias, 2000). For instance,
Kay and Jost (2003) found that when they threatened (and thereby activated)
individuals’ beliefs that the world is a just place, those individuals were faster to
respond to justice-related words than neutral words, and were faster than control
participants to respond to justice-related words. Baldwin et al. used a version of the
LDT to explore the beliefs that people with different attachment styles have about
others. Baldwin et al. compared the way that groups of individuals with different
attachment styles processed sentences that presented alternative interpersonal
outcomes. After identifying each participant as either secure, avoidant, or
anxiousambivalent, the authors asked participants to read context sentences
followed by target words that were designed to reveal their interpersonal expecta-
tions. For example, the context sentence if I try to get close to my partner then my
partner will . . . might be followed by the positive outcome word accept or the
negative outcome word reject. Each context sentence was briefly presented on a
computer screen to participants, and was immediately followed by either a negative
outcome word, a positive outcome word, or a non-word. Participants were simply
instructed to indicate (by pressing a button) whether each outcome word they viewed
was a real or a made-up word. Of interest was the time participants took to make
each decision. Baldwin et al. reasoned that securely attached participants should
hold positive expectations about their partners in terms of three domains (trust,
closeness and dependency), and therefore should be faster to respond to positive
outcome words within those domains. Conversely, insecurely attached participants
should hold negative expectations about their partners and therefore should be faster
to respond to negative outcome words. This pattern of results is exactly what was
found.
The current study adopted Baldwin et al.’s approach in order to investigate the
beliefs of CSOs, offender controls, and community-based controls. Participants were
presented with context sentences that related to Ward and Keenan’s (1999) five ITs.
Each sentence was followed by a letter sting that participants had to quickly identify
as either a word or a non-word. Target words were either IT-consistent (i.e. they
completed sentences in a way consistent with IT-based propositions), or IT-
inconsistent (i.e. they did not complete sentences in a way consistent with IT-based
propositions). It was hypothesised that if CSOs hold offence-supportive schemata,
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then relative to controls CSOs should be quicker to respond to IT-consistent than
IT-inconsistent words.
Method
Participants
One hundred men took part in this study: 32 CSOs, 37 offender controls, and 31
community-based controls.2 CSOs were men who at the time of testing were
incarcerated for sexually abusing a person under the age of 16. CSOs were aged from
21 to 77 years (M48.47, SD15.07) and their victims’ ages ranged from 2 to 15
years (M10.13, SD3.51). Although we initially aimed to recruit only untreated,
extrafamilial CSOs, our inclusion criteria had to be relaxed slightly to meet sample
size requirements. According to current and historic conviction records, 20 CSOs
were extrafamilial offenders, while 12 CSOs were intrafamilial offenders who had
molested only biological or non-biological family members. Three of the extra-
familial and none of the intrafamilial offenders had received cognitivebehavioural
therapy to reconstruct distorted offence-related cognitions. The three treated CSOs
had all committed at least one sexual assault against a child since receiving therapy.
The mean Static 99 score for all CSO participants indicated a medium recidivism risk
level (M3.06, SD2.38). The number of years that CSOs had spent in formal
education ranged from 9 to 11 years (M10.03, SD0.59). Five CSOs identified
themselves as Maori, 21 as European, and six as ‘other’.
Offender controls (OCs) were men who were serving a prison sentence for one or
more offences, but who had never been convicted of a sexual offence against a person
under the age of 16. Of our OCs, six men had a conviction for a sexual offence
against a person over 16 listed in their conviction history. OCs were aged from 18 to
69 years (M33.68, SD10.82). The number of years that OC participants had
spent in formal education ranged from 9 to 11 years (M9.60, SD0.64). Eighteen
OCs identified themselves as Maori, 16 as European, and three as ‘other’.
Community controls (CCs) were males living in Wellington, New Zealand, who
had never served a prison sentence or been convicted for a sexual offence. CCs were
aged from 21 to 59 years (M37.42, SD11.11). The number of years that CCs had
spent in formal education ranged from 9 to 11 years (M10.03, SD0.59). Four
CCs identified themselves as Maori, 22 as European, and five as ‘other’.
CSOs and OCs were recruited from New Zealand Department of Corrections
prisons. All offenders were recruited by unit managers, who distributed a recruitment
flyer to prisoners inviting them to put take part in a ‘word decision’ study.3 CCs were
recruited by emailing recruitment flyers to staff at the Wellington Branches of The
Samaritans and Youthline (two local volunteer helpline organisations) and to a
group of staff members within a large New Zealand company. Recruitment flyers for
CSOs, OCs and CCs stated that all participants should be able to read the
recruitment flyer with ease.
Characteristics of the participants are displayed in Table 1. The groups differed
significantly on age, F(2,97)12.85, pB0.001, with CSOs having a higher mean age
than OCs (M48.47, SD15.07 versus M33.68, SD10.82). CCs (M37.42,
SD11.11) did not differ in age from either offender group. The groups also differed
significantly on number of years spent in formal education, F(2,97)6.20, p0.003,
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with CSOs (M10.03, SD0.59) and CCs (M10.03, SD0.55) having spent
more years in formal education than OCs (M9.59, SD0.64). A chi-square test of
association also confirmed that between-group differences in ethnicity existed, x2 (4,
n100)14.32, p0.006, Cramer’s V0.268, with OCs having a significant
difference in ethnic mix compared to CSOs, x2 (2, n69)8.71, p0.013, Cramer’s
V0.355 and CCs, x2 (2, n68)9.90, p0.007, Cramer’s V0.382. Significant
differences also existed in total number of violent convictions recorded in CSOs’ and
OCs’ prison records, t(67)3.08, p0.003, with OCs (M4.08, SD4.03) having
significantly more mean violent convictions per participant than CSOs (M1.53,
SD0.45). Approximately 44% of CSOs and 76% of OCs had committed a violent
offence at some stage in their offending history.
Ethical considerations
Victoria University of Wellington and New Zealand Department of Corrections
approved all procedures and materials used in this study. Before testing, participants
read an information sheet outlining the details of the study and their participant
rights, and signed a consent form. The information sheet warned participants that
during the experiment written material would be presented that referred to criminal
activity, and some of this material would ‘link children and sex’. Participants were
also given the opportunity to request a combined debriefing and results summary
sheet once results had been collated.
Table 1. Demographic details for participant groups.
Child sex offenders
(n32)
Offender controls
(n37)
Community controls
(n31)
Age (years)
Mean 48.47 33.68 37.42***
SD 15.07 10.82 11.11
Years in education
Mean 10.03 9.59 10.03**
SD 0.59 0.64 0.55
Ethnicity (n)
Maori 5 18 4**
European 21 16 22**
Other 6 3 5**
Sentence (years)
Mean 7.13 5.75 
SD 4.08 3.77 
Violent convictions
(per person)
Mean 1.53 4.08** 
SD 2.55 4.03 
*pB0.05; **pB0.01; ***pB0.001.
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Design
The experimental design was based on the LDT method used by Baldwin et al.
(1993). A computer task was set up so that participants were presented with 45
incomplete sentences (word stems), each of which was followed by a word or a non-
word. Thirty words and 15 non-words followed the 45 word stems. Fifteen of the 30
words completed the sentence in a way that was offence-supportive (i.e. consistent
with IT-related beliefs), while the other 15 words completed the sentence in a
nonoffence supportive manner.
Materials
It was possible that reading speed differences between participants might have a
confounding effect on LDT responses. Therefore, before the experiment commenced
participants completed a reading speed task that would allow adjustment of LDT
responses according to individual differences. Ten simple-structure sentences and 10
complex-structure sentences (rated on structure complexity by Fischler & Bloom,
1980) were presented to participants via the Superlab program. Participants were
asked to press any button on the response pad to indicate that they had finished
reading each sentence.
We created 45 incomplete word stems, and to each word stem we assigned three
letter strings (one offence-supportive completion word, one nonoffence-supportive
completion word, and one non-word). Non-words were generated by taking
common verbs (e.g. dribble, dance) and changing one letter (e.g. kribble, wance).
Non-words were matched for number of characters with real words. An ANOVA
confirmed that target word length did not differ significantly across completion word
type (offence-supportive, nonoffence-supportive, and non-word), F(2,132)0.18,
p0.837. A t-test confirmed that offence-supportive and nonoffence-supportive
target words did not differ according to ranked frequency of use in New Zealand
English, t(88)1.19, p0.236.
Below is an example word stem and three letter strings that were assigned to it (for
a full list of word stems and letter strings used in this experiment refer to Table 2):
Word stem Letter string
Having sex with children won’t do them any HARM (offence-supportive)
GOOD (nonoffence-supportive)
KNID (non-word)
Three versions of the LDT were created and 45 of 135 possible word stemletter
string combinations were assigned to each version (15 offence-supportive, 15
nonoffence-supportive, 15 non-words). Participants were randomly assigned to
versions 1, 2 or 3 of the LDT.4 Within each LDT version, the five IT categories
identified by Ward and Keenan (1999) were represented evenly among the 45
sentences that were presented (i.e. nine sentences representing each IT were shown).
No participant saw the same word stem or letter string twice.
Apparatus
The reading task and LDT were programmed using a Superlab package. The
program was run on a 12 inch colour monitor screen, resolution1024768 pixels
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Table 2. Context sentences and target words by implicit theory.
Target word type
Implicit theory Word stem
Offence
supportive
Nonoffence
supportive Non-word
Dangerous world On the whole, people are mean nice vull
Most of us are really seeking power love umile
The world is full of danger people tipsoe
Most people want to do damage good hinger
People who trust others are strange normal snither
People look out for themselves others ungerstand
If you don’t strike first you are weak slow brab
Compared to adults, children are safe small salk
The best people to trust are kids adults Devy
Entitlement When you’re lonely, turning to a
child for sex is
fine bad lish
When it comes to sex, sometimes
a man must exercise his
rights will meadle
A man who puts his needs ahead
of his child’s is
strong mean sheeze
The idea that men are better than
women or children is
right false lauth
If a man is deprived of sex,
sleeping with a child is
okay wrong zine
Doing what I want, when
I want is
good wrong zine
Always putting yourself first is healthy unfair ottager
If I hurt others to get what
I need, I feel
fine guilty kilp
If a woman doesn’t give a man
what he needs, he must exercise
force control droam
Uncontrollability Sexual relations with children
cannot be
helped allowed mollow
Sometimes, giving in to a sexual
urge is a
must crime reak
When a man says he can’t resist
touching children he is
right wrong caich
Sex with some children is simply inevitable ignored steaighten
People can’t control anything everything jolidify
People who try to change things
are
odd great nop
Being unable to resist
temptation is
normal bad scleam
People who try to make changes
in their lives are
blind healthy skretch
Giving in to all your sexual urges
is just
human weak drike
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Table 2 (Continued)
Target word type
Implicit theory Word stem
Offence
supportive
Nonoffence
supportive Non-word
Nature of harm Just touching a child’s private
parts is
okay wrong gwin
The belief that sex harms all
children is
false true falm
Having sex with children won’t
do them any
harm good knid
If a child is quiet during sexual
activity, they are probably feeling
glad shocked eddress
Sexual activity can contribute to
a child’s
learning problems struddle
A child who is fondled by an
adult will probably be
okay hurt jick
If a child is molested while they
sleep they will probably be
fine hurt jerf
Some children don’t tell if they
have been fondled because they
are secretly
pleased frightened kribble
Sexual activity with a child can
teach that child to
love fear prink
Children as sexual
beings
Sometimes children don’t
complain about being fondled
because they feel
pleased scared squeebe
If a child shows you their
bottom, they probably think you
will find it
exciting funny cotplain
A child who wants to see your
genitals is
dirty curious trush
If a child hops in your bed they
probably want to be
felt held bote
Sometimes, after doing sexual
things, children feel
nice sick hing
Young girls who show their
knickers are just being
bad kids jad
Some kids are very sexual honest scramch
A child who asks where babies
come from wants to know
more about
sex life hup
Children who show an interest in
sex are
dirty normal grive
Mean word length (number of letters) 5.36 5.20 5.40
Mean ranked frequency of usage in New Zealand
English
163.44 242.38 
326 K. Keown et al.
from a Dell Pentium Latitude D600 laptop computer. Written instructions and
stimuli were centred on a white screen in bold black Times New Roman text (font
size 40). Participants made their responses on a Cedrus Model RB-730 response pad
that held seven response keys. The two endmost keys had a coloured covering (one
yellow and one green) while the keys in between were white. Two labels (reading
‘made-up word’ and ‘real word’) were placed on the response pad above the two
coloured keys; placement of labels was counterbalanced across participants.
The Superlab program controlled the random presentation of 20 sentences in the
reading task and recorded (in milliseconds) the time that elapsed between each
button press the participant made to view a new sentence. The programme also
controlled the random presentation of word stems and letter strings in the LDT, and
recorded the reaction time (RT) and type of response (correct/incorrect) made. Each
word stem was presented to participants individually for 3000 ms.5 Immediately
following presentation of each incomplete sentence, a letter string (i.e. a word or a
non-word) appeared on the screen for 2000 ms. To encourage rapid responding, the
computer emitted a loud whistling sound if a participant did not register their
response to the letter string within 2000 ms.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually, in a single session. Each testing session took
approximately 30 minutes per participant. After giving written consent participants
were asked to give some basic demographic information about themselves such as
age, ethnicity, and years of formal education. Next, participants were verbally
instructed on how to complete the reading test. They were told to read at a normal,
comfortable reading speed, and to press any button on the response pad once they
had read the full sentence. Unfortunately, we could not use these reading speed
measures in the final analysis since they appeared to be an unreliable measure, as
participants often talked through this reading task.
Participants were then given verbal instructions on how to complete the LDT and
were taken through a practice phase. The experimenter watched as each participant
completed the practice run. If any participant appeared to be struggling with the task
the experimenter would take the participant’s place and have them watch as the
experimenter completed the practice run. The participant would then complete the
practice phase again.
Upon completion of a satisfactory practice run, participants were told to follow
the same procedure during the experimental phase that they did during the practice
phase, paying careful attention to each word stem. All participants were again
warned that they would see material during the task that they may find distasteful,
but to try not to be distracted by this. It was stressed that their task was not to make
a value judgment about the appropriateness of completion words, but rather to
simply indicate whether they were viewing a word or non-word. When they were
ready to start the experimental phase participants pressed any key on their response
pad. To make participants feel comfortable during the task, the experimenter stayed
in the room but faced away from the computer screen and read some papers until the
participant indicated that they had finished.
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Results
Results were analysed to see whether they confirmed the hypothesis that CSOs alone
would respond in a way that indicated they held schemas containing offence-
supportive content. CSOs’, OCs’ and CCs’ reaction times were compared to see
whether CSOs were faster to identify words that completed sentences in an IT-
consistent way (i.e. offence-supportive words) than words that did not complete
sentences in an IT-consistent way (i.e. nonoffence-supportive words).
To investigate, each participant’s reaction times were summed and averaged to
produce mean reaction times within 12 variables. The 12 variables were: All offence-
supportive word RTs; All nonoffence-supportive word RTs; Offence-supportive word
RTs for each of the five individual IT categories; and Nonoffence-supportive word
RTs for each of the five individual IT categories.
To measure each participant’s basic speed of responding, mean reaction times to
the 15 non-words were also calculated. Because non-words are devoid of semantic
meaning they could not be primed by sentence stem content; mean non-word RTs
therefore served as a covariate measure of participant cognitive processing and
motor response speed. It should be noted here that that although age and years of
formal education significantly differentiated our groups (see Method), neither of
these factors were significant covariates and so we do not report them in the
following analyses.
Data preparation
Only response times from correct responses were analysed.6 Reaction time data
generally contains outlying data points that represent factors that are unrelated to
the hypothesis (e.g. attentional lapses and unintentional motor responses). Thus, it is
important to separate these outliers from data that reflect reactions arising from the
cognitive mechanisms under investigation (Ratcliff, 1993). In accordance with
previous research (e.g. Cumming, Graham, & Patterson, 2006; Holden, Kroner,
Fekken, & Popham, 1992; Ratcliff, 1993; Welford, 1981), measures were taken to
adjust for such outliers. Mean RTs to non-words and to each of the 12 variables
described above were Windsorised (Barnett & Lewis, 1978). That is, extremely high
RT scores (i.e. RTs more than two standard deviations above the group mean) were
assigned the next lowest RT for that group and especially slow RT scores (i.e. RTs
more than two standard deviations below the group mean) were assigned the next
highest RT for that group. This adjustment ensured that all RTs were included in the
data set while mitigating for the impact of potentially spurious responses.
Table 3 lists the three participant groups’ mean Windsorised reaction times to the
non-words and the 12 variables listed above.
Main analysis of response times
To calculate each participant’s shift in reaction time between the two word types,
mean RTs to all offence-supportive words were subtracted from mean RTs to all
nonoffence-supportive words. This generated an overall mean difference in RTs, with
positive scores indicating faster responding to offence-supportive content relative to
nonoffence supportive content (i.e. responses are offence-supportive). Negative
scores, on the other hand indicate faster responding to nonoffence-supportive
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content relative to offence supportive content (i.e. responses are nonoffence-
supportive).
To investigate the effects of group (CSO, OC, CC) and word type (offence-
supportive, nonoffence-supportive) on reaction time, an ANCOVA was carried out
with mean difference in RTs as the dependent variable and group as the fixed factor.
Non-word RTs were identified as a significant covariate and were added to control
for individual differences in generalised processing and response speeds. The results
of the ANCOVA were surprising, as they demonstrated no significant interaction,
F(2,96) 2.08, p0.131, eta20.041. In other words, against our predictions CSOs
did not respond faster to offence-supportive words relative to nonoffence-supportive
words when compared to OCs and CCs (see Figure 1). Post hoc tests revealed that no
group (CSO, OC or CC) could be statistically differentiated from another.
Interestingly, these results held regardless of CSO offence characteristics (i.e. when
the ANCOVA was run with only intrafamilial CSOs’ responses or only extrafamilial
CSOs’ responses included in the data, the above pattern of results was replicated).
Contrary to predictions, shifts in RTs to offence-supportive and nonoffence-
supportive words ran in the nonoffence-supportive direction for CSOs (M25.80),
as well as OCs (M59.87), and CCs (M15.28). Hence, all three groups
demonstrated a pattern of responding seeming to indicate that they did not hold
offence-supportive schemata.
While overall responses did not indicate that CSOs were interpreting information
in an offensive-supportive way, more detailed analysis may reveal that CSOs appear
more distorted within certain IT categories. To investigate whether this was the case,
we generated a mean difference in offence-supportive and nonoffence-supportive RT
responses for each of the following categories of items: children as sexual beings,
dangerous world, entitlement, nature of harm, and uncontrollability.
Table 3. Participant groups’ mean reaction times to LDT words and non-words.
CSO OC CC
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
All non-words 1025.18 154.54 1040.24 167.88 824.14 150.76
Offence-supportive
All ITs combined 962.92 187.68 942.51 164.05 773.46 148.62
Children as sexual beings 990.92 192.00 958.48 189.26 823.54 174.99
Dangerous world 871.54 161.92 871.99 155.45 725.45 141.25
Entitlement 956.69 233.41 909.92 203.58 757.18 197.11
Nature of harm 1014.50 295.97 941.62 193.69 757.34 167.13
Uncontrollability 956.93 215.38 1014.80 255.98 794.30 165.78
Non offence-supportive
All ITs combined 929.13 173.68 872.52 110.52 778.50 133.88
Children as sexual beings 938.41 210.17 920.59 149.61 752.25 138.64
Dangerous world 857.55 206.38 788.27 146.75 727.65 162.50
Entitlement 946.51 174.12 887.26 150.11 806.59 150.55
Nature of harm 930.47 213.23 860.67 156.13 803.20 167.59
Uncontrollability 974.14 188.31 887.93 155.05 787.55 148.65
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For each of these five ITs an ANCOVA was run to examine the effects of group
(CSO, OC, CC) and word type (offence-supportive, nonoffence-supportive) on mean
reaction time. For each ANCOVA, mean difference in RTs was the dependent
variable, group was the fixed factor, and mean non-word RTs were the covariate
(although the pattern of results for all analyses described below pertained when
mean non-word RTs were not added as a covariate, with the uninterpretable
exception that CCs obtained more positive scores than CSOs for nature of harm, and
CSOs in turn obtained more positive scores than OCs).
The children as sexual beings ANCOVA did not reveal a significant interaction
between group, word type, and mean reaction time, F(2,96) 0.15, p0.862, eta2
0.003. Likewise, significant interactions were not found for dangerous world, F(2,96)
2.08, p0.131, eta20.041, entitlement, F(2,96) 0.08, p0.927, eta20.002, and
nature of harm, F(2,96) 1.67, p0.194, eta20.034. However, the ANCOVA
examining uncontrollability did demonstrate a significant interaction, F(2,96) 4.33,
p0.016, eta20.083. Post hoc tests revealed that CSOs’ RT shift (M20.35) was
significantly different to OCs (M122.90). Although CSOs’ RT shift was not
significantly different from that of CCs (M14.75), it should be noted that CSOs
demonstrated a positive shift in RTs, indicating an offence-supportive response
pattern, while OCs and CCs demonstrated a negative (nonoffence-supportive) shift
(see Figure 2).
Note that the standard error of the mean for uncontrollability is larger than for all
ITs combined. This pattern was found for each of the five ITs when they were
considered in isolation and reflects the fact that a smaller sample size (i.e. number of
scores) comprised mean RT differences within each IT than for all ITs combined.
To summarise, our overall hypothesis was not supported by the data. CSOs did
not demonstrate an offence-supportive pattern of responding compared to OCs and
CCs when RTs to all ITs were combined. This pattern of results also held for RTs to
children as sexual beings, dangerous world, entitlement, and nature of harm. However,
when RTs to uncontrollability were compared, CSOs’ RTs significantly differed from
OCs’. That is, CSOs demonstrated offence-supportive responding for this IT, while
OCs and CCs did not.
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Figure 1. Mean differences (9SEM) in offence-supportive and nonoffence-supportive
reaction times to all implicit theories.
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Discussion
It was predicted that CSOs would show a pattern of faster response times to IT-
consistent target words than IT-inconsistent words relative to offender and
community controls. In the main, this hypothesis was not supported. Overall,
CSOs did not respond faster to offence-supportive words than nonoffence-
supportive words, and their response times to target words could not be
differentiated statistically from the control groups’. For four out of the five IT
categories (children as sexual beings, dangerous world, entitlement, and nature of
harm) this pattern of results held true. Interestingly, however, responses to the
uncontrollability IT revealed a pattern consistent with our proposed hypothesis. Here
CSOs did respond faster to offence-supportive than nonoffence-supportive words,
and their scores were significantly faster than OCs’.
Taken together, the findings of our study suggest that our CSO participants did
not hold offence-supportive beliefs. These findings support those of Gannon et al.
(2006), who could find no evidence that CSOs were misinterpreting offence
descriptions in line with offence-supportive beliefs. Questionnaire and interview
studies frequently find evidence that CSOs endorse cognitive distortions. Therefore
the lack of evidence that CSOs hold offence-supportive beliefs found in this and
Gannon et al.’s (2006) study suggests that CSOs’ cognitive distortions may not be
driven primarily by false beliefs. This in turn suggests that additional mechanisms
must be at work; a finding consistent with recent proposals that social and self-
protective phenomena (Maruna & Mann, 2006), or judgment processes (Ward et al.,
2006) may play a role. Of course, the results of this and Gannon et al.’s study do not
suggest that ITs or faulty core beliefs play no role in the generation of cognitive
distortions. Rather, they indicate that faulty core beliefs underlie the cognitive
distortions of only some CSOs.
The findings cast an interesting light on the Implicit Association Task studies
carried out by Mihailides et al. (2004) and Gray et al. (2005). In the Mihailides et al.
study, associations were found between CSOs’ concept of sex and children and those
of sex and uncontrollability. Likewise, Gray et al. found CSOs held associations
between children and sex concepts. Both sets of authors concluded that their results
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Figure 2. Mean differences (9SEM) in offence-supportive and nonoffence-supportive
reaction times to uncontrollability.
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supported the idea that CSOs hold ITs that set them apart from others. In this study
we found some evidence that our CSO sample held an uncontrollability IT, but no
evidence that a children as sexual beings IT was held. This latter finding underscores
our earlier point that holding associated concepts is a different cognitive
phenomenon to holding distorted beliefs.
Participants’ responses to uncontrollability are intriguing, as CSOs’ mean scores
significantly differed from OCs’. The uncontrollability IT generated the most extreme
scores from the offender groups, with CSOs producing their only mean positive (or
offence-supportive) score, and OCs producing their most negative (or nonoffence-
supportive) score. One could interpret the positive CSO response as supporting
Ward’s theory (Ward & Keenan, 1999; Ward, 2000) that CSOs have ITs that support
propositions about uncontrollability. However, the fact that CSOs’ responses to this
IT did not significantly differ from CCs’ calls this interpretation into question. The
significant difference between CSOs’ and OCs’ responses might also be construed as
evidence that CSOs hold an uncontrollability IT. Yet this interpretation is again
problematic, because the difference between the two offender groups is partly
attributable to OCs having such a strong negative response to the uncontrollability
IT. Exactly why OCs’ responses were so negative for this IT is unclear. Perhaps it
relates to the fact that the OC sample was predominantly made up of men convicted
of violent acts (76% of OCs had committed at least one violent offence). At some
stage in their history of incarceration a number of these men may have received anger
management therapy that involved modification of beliefs pertaining to uncontroll-
ability. Unfortunately, the treatment experiences of offender controls were not
recorded, so it is difficult to ascertain what affect, if any, exposure to treatment may
have had on offender controls’ uncontrollability responses.
Another explanation exists for the difference between OCs’ and CSOs’
uncontrollability responses. Coping with the demands of a prison environment
(where self protection is important and sexual activity is tightly constrained) may
have led OC participants to believe they can look after themselves and control their
sexual urges. In contrast, the CSO sample might have had experiences that limited
their opportunities to develop these beliefs (e.g. receiving constant threats from other
prisoners may have led to a sense of vulnerability and reflecting on the nature of their
crimes may have prevented formation of beliefs that sexual impulses can be
controlled).
Yet another possibility is that the significant difference between OCs’ and CSOs’
uncontrollability responses is linked to cultural differences. With Maori comprising
49% of the OC sample, compared to 16% of the CSO sample, the difference in
uncontrollability scores might be attributable to Maori participants holding low
levels of uncontrollability beliefs. Further experimental research is needed to clarify
whether the difference in cognitions regarding uncontrollability between CSOs and
other offenders is a widespread phenomenon.
A potential limitation in this study is that some participants may have deduced
task aims and deliberately responded to some words slower than others. However, it
seems unlikely that participants surmised that responding slower to offence-
supportive words would make them look less distorted. In fact, verbal feedback
from participants on completion of the task indicated general confusion about the
aim of the experiment, with some participants expressing doubt that it could tell the
experimenter anything useful at all. Furthermore, having a mere 2000 ms in which to
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respond would have made it very difficult for participants to decide whether or not
they were viewing a real word and decide whether or not to deliberately stall each
response. Nevertheless, some individuals did get removed from this study because
they made too many errors or non-responses. Perhaps these individuals made
mistakes because they were distracted by concerns about what the experiment might
reveal regarding their cognitions. Unfortunately we cannot confirm or deny this
possibility.
This study could have been improved by asking all participants to complete a
cognitive distortion questionnaire so that their responses could be compared with
their LDT scores. Showing conclusively that our CSOs had higher levels of
endorsement than control groups on cognitive distortion items would have
strengthened our claim that cognitive distortion endorsements may not necessarily
reflect faulty beliefs. However, the fact that our sample was composed primarily of
extrafamilial CSOs makes it likely that our CSO sample would have endorsed
cognitive distortions, since extrafamilial CSOs are commonly reported as being more
cognitively distorted than intrafamilial CSOs (Fisher et al., 1999).
Regardless of any potential limitations, this study certainly adds weight to recent
calls by researchers to question the assumption that all cognitive distortions reflect
underlying offence-supportive beliefs (see Gannon & Polaschek, 2006; Maruna &
Mann, 2006; Ward et al., 2006). One implication of this study, therefore, is that
researchers and clinicians need to consider what other potential drivers of cognitive
distortions are at work. Some researchers have already begun this task. For example,
Ward et al. (2006) have put forward a Judgment Model of Cognitive Distortions, in
which CSOs’ value- and action-based judgments interact dynamically with belief-
based judgments to produce cognitive distortions. Maruna and Mann (2006) have
also written a fascinating article in which they argue that cognitive distortions may
often be post hoc justifications that CSOs make in order to protect their self image
and discourage others from appraising them negatively. As the authors note, this
kind of excuse-making is a normal and accepted response to committing social
wrongs. The authors go on to point out that, ‘In clinical practice, the term cognitive
distortion has become confused with any causal explanation for offending given by
offenders, no matter how valid the explanation might be . . .’ (p. 7).
Maruna and Mann also claim that cognitive distortions may sometimes be quite
valid descriptions of factors that helped commission offending. Further support for
this idea can be found in the results of an interview study conducted by Drapeau,
Korner, Granger, and Brunet (2005). When Drapeau et al. asked CSOs for feedback
on an inmate treatment programme, the respondents complained that therapists
sometimes didn’t believe their genuine descriptions of offence-related events. By
overdiagnosing offenders’ statements as faulty beliefs psychologists risk damaging
clienttherapist rapport and may ignore important situational cues that play a
unique role in CSOs’ actions and therefore should be avoided or minimised.
The current study also implies that treatment programmes need to tailor
programmes that are better suited to CSOs who do not hold faulty beliefs. As
Kirsch and Becker (2005) note, sexual offender treatments are primarily provided in
a group format where all members receive the same cognitive interventions. The
authors state that cognitivebehavioural treatment effectiveness could be improved
by targeting only those factors that are relevant to sexual offending intervention. For
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some CSOs this may mean reducing the time spent restructuring distorted
cognitions.
Future research should be directed at implementing other cognitive experimental
techniques in the study of sexual offenders’ implicit cognitions. Future studies might
investigate whether trying to prime CSOs’ cognitive structures with relevant
situational cues can produce evidence of faulty beliefs or schemata. As an example
of this approach, two of the current authors have just conducted a study in which
they tried to activate CSOs’ offence-supportive schemata by priming them with
pictures of semi-clothed children and then investigated whether they interpreted
ambiguous sentences in an offence-supportive way.
It is our belief that psychological science is currently in its infancy in terms of
understanding the nature and structure of sexual offender’s cognitions. We hope that
through the application of well-considered experimental approaches psychologists
will clarify the interactive roles that beliefs, attitudes, values, goals, situated
cognitions and embodied cognitions play in commissioning sexual offending against
children.
Studies also need to be conducted that explore other drivers of cognitive
distortions. For example, by manipulating the personal and interpersonal circum-
stances in which cognitive distortions are measured, psychologists may reach a
greater understanding of the types of processes, both internal and external to CSOs,
that determine whether they are likely to endorse or articulate a proposition that
appears ‘distorted’ to onlookers.
In conclusion, the findings from this study have called into question the idea that
CSOs articulate and/or endorse cognitive distortions because they hold abnormal,
offence-supportive beliefs. This study has underscored the need for alternative
research methods to be used in conjunction with questionnaire-based approaches
when trying to understand the cognitive processes of CSOs. In addition, it has
indicated that researchers and clinicians should continue to strive for a better
understanding of the mechanisms underlying cognitive distortions. Eventually this
knowledge might allow us to identify when and how it is most effective to challenge
CSOs’ ‘cognitive distortions’.
Notes
1. Because empathy deficits reflect an inability to recognise victim harm, in recent years they
have been subsumed under the category of cognitive distortions (Marshall, Anderson, &
Fernandez, 1999; Ward & Beech, 2005)
2. A total of 115 men completed the experiment (41 child sexual offenders, 43 offender
controls, and 31 community controls). However, 15 participants were dropped from the
study because they made more than six errors out of 45 trials during testing  an error rate
of 13%.
3. Because we did not directly distribute fliers to prisoners we cannot say what proportion of
men who were asked to take part in the study agreed to participate.
4. ANOVAs confirmed that participant groups in the three LDT versions did not significantly
differ in terms of age, years of education, and reaction times to offence-supportive words,
nonoffence-supportive words or non-words, while a chi-square test found no differences in
ethnicity.
5. Incomplete sentence presentation duration was based on feedback from five independent
community-based raters. On completion of the experiment all participants were asked to
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rate sentence presentation on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (Much too quickly) to
4 (Much too slowly). Mean rating was 2.11, indicating that, on average, participants felt
incomplete sentences were presented ‘at the right speed’.
6. Ninety-nine per cent of all responses were correct.
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